

# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An analysis of current international events*



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## MacArthur Hearings Leave Asian Strategy Uncertain

WASHINGTON—Whoever has sought in the testimony at the Capitol since May 3 convincing evidence as to whether General Douglas MacArthur or his critics in the Administration offer the wiser strategy is bound to be disappointed.

Only the course of events can answer this question. If, as General Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has indicated to the committees conducting the hearings, the rate of casualties currently being suffered by the Chinese in North Korea leads to a Communist peace feeler, the Administration will be vindicated in its policy of limiting the war to Korea. If, however, the war should drag on indecisively for many more months, one may expect a growing demand in this country for trying General MacArthur's suggestion to carry the war to Chinese territory, at least in the air, even if by that time little interest survives in General MacArthur himself. Military witnesses at the hearings have thrown doubt on the General's hitherto unchallenged reputation for unquestioned competence as a field commander. The very length of time during which the hearings have continued since MacArthur himself testified has served to obscure the personal issue once prominently involved in the larger question of national policy.

The Administration might have won decisive backing during the hearings for the possibility of a long-continuing struggle in Korea if its witnesses had given the committees a clear and simple statement of the assumptions which President Truman accepted on June 25, 1950 when he ordered American intervention on behalf of the Republic of Korea and then sought United Nations support for his action. Secretary

of State Dean Acheson skirted this question by stating optimistically on June 1 that intervention in Korea had ended Communist hopes to "shake the free nations of Asia and to paralyze the defense of Europe." While this may be true, it will

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is not the kind of precise measuring-rod with which Americans can determine whether the course and consequences of the war fit in with the President's expectations of last June.

### Light from the Hearings

In some respects the hearings conducted by the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees under the chairmanship of Senator Richard B. Russell, Democrat of Georgia, have given Americans a clearer understanding of the aim of their country in world affairs than they had previously received from official sources. Secretary of Defense Marshall, Secretary of State Acheson and the four officers who make up the Joint Chiefs of Staff have all stressed the peaceful aim of United States rearmament. They feared that General MacArthur's suggestion for air assault on Chinese territory would defeat that aim by inciting the Soviet Union to enter the Far Eastern war and perhaps to attack in Europe.

They presented a united front also in supporting the proposition that the United States must act in concert with other friendly powers. Although Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, chief of naval operations, took a novel stand in recommending on May 31 the imposition of a naval blockade of China, he made it clear that he favored the blockade only if the United Nations called for it.

The military witnesses agreed that General MacArthur, by his actions and statements, jeopardized the plans for the conduct of the war worked out in Washington. The Joint Chiefs of Staff criticized his tactic of dividing his force in northern Korea last autumn as he approached the Yalu River boundary with Manchuria. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force chief of staff, testified that American strategic air power was inadequate to serve the purpose which MacArthur suggested for it in Manchuria.

The witnesses brought out that the Joint Chiefs, on December 6, 1950, had sent a memorandum to General MacArthur intending to restrain him from making public statements without clearing them beforehand with Washington. Nevertheless, MacArthur, without informing Truman of his intention, on March 24 publicly invited the enemy to meet him in the field to arrange an armistice. General Bradley thought that this invitation, which came to nothing, damaged an effort the President had initiated on March 20 (about which he had immediately informed MacArthur) to work out an armistice offer with the help of our UN allies. While the testimony implies that MacArthur often acted in contravention of Washington policy, at the same time it reveals a marked

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reluctance on the part of the President, the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff ever to give MacArthur an explicit order. They dealt with him in gingerly fashion. The memorandum of December 6 did not clearly tell him to submit his statements to Washington for approval. Had the instructions been concrete and plain, had some authority in Washington told MacArthur long ago to say nothing at all about political policy, perhaps he would have resigned in indignation sometime before he was relieved or would have acquiesced in the instructions and thus made his removal unnecessary. Instead, civilian and military authorities showered him with vague hints.

### *Some Uncertainties*

Other matters have been obscured by the fog which arises from the cascade of testimony like that which usually hovers over great waterfalls. General J. Lawton Collins, Army chief of staff, indicated that he would be satisfied if the war ended in the general area where it began, near the 38th Parallel. Such an ending would probably mean a continuation of a divided Korea, but Mr. Acheson said that unification of Korea was a war aim. The military and the State Department disagreed at one time as to whether UN planes should be permitted to go after enemy planes in "hot pursuit" into skies above Chinese terri-

tory. Finding our UN associates in the war opposed to such action, the State Department dissuaded the military establishment from authorizing it. Secretary Acheson has so far declined to ask the UN to approve the naval blockade which Admiral Sherman recommends.

The hearings, moreover, have added new confusion to the history and present nature of our policy toward Formosa. Over the objections of Secretary Acheson the two committees on June 1 voted 15 to 9 (with 5 Democrats among the 15 and 1 Republican among the 9) to make public a memorandum of December 23, 1949, by which the State Department instructed information officers in the Far East to follow a propaganda line of indifference, or, perhaps, more accurately, sour grapes, about the fate of Formosa. The island then seemed likely to fall under Communist control. "All material," ran the memorandum, "should be used best to counter the false impressions that: (1) Formosa's retention would save the Chinese government; . . . (3) its loss would seriously damage the interests of either the United States or of other countries opposing communism; (4) the United States is responsible for or committed in any way to act to save Formosa." Secretary Acheson said that the assertions represented not the conception which the American government had

of Formosa's usefulness but an effort "to minimize the effects of the fall" of Formosa, then expected.

Actually, however, the memorandum did represent basically the official attitude of the United States toward Formosa at that time. Both Secretary Acheson and President Truman in January 1950 publicly stated: "The United States government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the United States government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa." The outbreak of the war in Korea has brought a thoroughgoing change in our policy toward Formosa, politically and militarily. In January 1950 Acheson said that the United States regarded Formosa as a province of China, in accordance with the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and the Potsdam Agreement of 1945, and that we would not wait for a treaty to make good on Cairo and Potsdam. On June 1 Acheson told the Senate committees that the ultimate control of Formosa should be settled in the United Nations or in the Japanese peace treaty.

So, while the hearings have on the whole proved instructive about Korea, they have not been illuminating about policy in other parts of Asia.

BLAIR BOLLES

## ***Will Paris Talks Lead to Big Four Conference?***

Rumors of "peace feelers" from the East—unconfirmed in Moscow or Peiping—were given a stronger impetus on June 1 when Trygve Lie, secretary-general of the United Nations, declared in Ottawa that the UN forces in Korea had achieved their mission. "If a cease-fire could be arranged approximately along the 38th Parallel," Mr. Lie declared, "then the main purpose of the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and July 7 [1950] would be fulfilled." The following day, in a statement on UN military objectives in Korea, General James A. Van Fleet stated that while the Eighth Army would continue "to stop the enemy's unwarranted aggression against South Korea, and will, when necessary and profitable, meet such threats within North Korea," the "pursuit phase" of operations is over.

From London British officials were reported to believe that the time was ripe for a new diplomatic approach to Peiping and that the UN nations' fighting in Korea should announce their intention not to push far into North Korea. This latter view seemed to be borne out by a state-

ment, relatively little noted, made by General J. Lawton Collins before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees when he said on May 26 that last autumn the Joint Chiefs of Staff had thought General MacArthur should stop "somewhat short of the Yalu River." When queried on this point, General Collins explained he and his colleagues then felt that if the UN forces went beyond the river, the Chinese Communists "might feel that from their own security standpoint . . . they would have to come across and see that we did not get those heights."

### *Invitation to Washington*

While the question of a cease-fire in Korea remained in suspense, the United States, with the unqualified support of Britain and France, sought to end the four-power negotiations of deputy foreign ministers, now entering the fourth month, by proposing a conference of the Big Four foreign ministers in Washington on July 23. In a note delivered on May 31 to Russian delegate Andrei A. Gromyko, a copy

of which was presented in Moscow the same day (similar notes were presented in Paris and Moscow by Britain and France), the United States government declared it considers "that the amount of agreement so far reached on the agenda makes possible a meeting of the four foreign ministers which would permit discussion among others of all topics proposed by the Soviet government in the exchange of notes preceding the Paris conference and on the 5th and 7th of March at the outset of that conference." The United States expressed its readiness to participate in the proposed conference on three alternative agendas—A, B and C—the texts of which were enclosed.

Of the three alternative agendas, A and B are the most detailed (C is a list of five main items for discussion), and B reveals most clearly the points of disagreement between the Western powers and Russia. If any one of the three alternative agendas is accepted, the Big Four foreign ministers' conference would discuss "the causes and effects of present international tensions in Europe and of the means to secure a real

and lasting improvement in the relations" of the four nations, notably the demilitarization of Germany, the existing level of armaments and measures for the international control and reduction of armaments and armed forces. The conference would also discuss completion of a treaty with Austria, problems relating to the re-establishment of German unity and the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany; and fulfillment of the treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary as well as of the section of the Italian peace treaty concerning Trieste.

### **Germany: Key Problem**

During the weeks of tedious debate between the deputy foreign ministers at the Palais Rose it has become increasingly evident that while the future of Germany remains the main issue at stake in Europe, the focus of Russia's interest has undergone a noticeable change since November 3, 1950, when it first proposed a Big Four conference. At that time the United States was urging the prompt rearmament of West Germany. The Kremlin then stressed the need to keep the Germans demilitarized (although, as pointed out by the Western powers, it had proceeded with the rearmament of East Germany) and pressed for German unity.

When it became clear that the West Germans were not eager to be armed and Washington, complying with General

Dwight D. Eisenhower's view that German rearmament was not a top priority need, soft-pedaled its demand on that score, the Soviet government shifted its approach. It then began to insist at Paris that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and United States bases in Europe should be placed on the agenda. This was rejected by the Western powers, which contend that the collective military measures taken by the North Atlantic nations are not a threat to peace and were adopted solely to meet the danger of Russia's aggression as exemplified by the high level of its armaments and the rearmament, in excess of levels set by the peace treaties, of Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

The Soviet government, in its reply of June 4 to the notes of the three Western powers, stated that it was prepared to send Foreign Minister Andrei Y. Vishinskiy "immediately" to a Big Four conference in Washington—but only on condition that the agenda for such a conference should include the subject of the North Atlantic pact and American military bases abroad. Since the Western powers have indicated their firm opposition to this condition, Washington regards Moscow's reply as a rejection of its invitation to a Big Four conference. The American public, wearied by the length and seeming inconclusiveness of the Paris conference, has begun to wonder whether negotiations with the U.S.S.R. are worth while. These negotia-

tions, however, have already clarified a number of issues, and whether Moscow ultimately agrees or not to a foreign ministers' conference in Washington, it has so far failed to disrupt the North Atlantic coalition or to make it a subject of East-West discussion. There is also some indication that the Kremlin may be awaiting developments in Korea, with the possibility in mind that negotiations about Europe might be linked with negotiations about Far Eastern problems.

While the issue of West German rearmament is not for the present of urgent importance, both the Western nations and Russia, in their appraisal of the European situation, recognize that whichever side can command the resources of the Ruhr will control the economic, and hence eventually the military, balance of power on the continent. Some observers have recently expressed the view that the Soviet government, acknowledging the unpopularity of the Communists in Germany, has for the time being relegated German unity to the background. If that is true, then to quote a French saying, Russia may be moving back only to jump the better. For quite aside from the question of rearmament, the future of Germany in political and economic terms remains of paramount significance to Russia.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The present political and economic situation in Germany will be analyzed in the next issue of the *Bulletin*.)

## **How Will French Elections Affect Western Defense?**

The deserted corridors of France's National Assembly echo to the scurrying footsteps of an occasional politician or journalist hastening to complete a final errand, and Frenchmen have turned their attention to the public squares where brightly colored posters and election orators proclaim the merits and demerits of rival political parties. The builders of the North Atlantic treaty system, meanwhile, are watching the proceedings with quiet but intense interest, anxiously looking for evidence that France can provide a strong European anchor for Western defense.

They have scrutinized the municipal and provincial elections held in Northern Italy on May 27 for hints about popular tendencies in France. In Italy an anti-Communist coalition won control from the Communists of 800 cities and towns. But the victory resulted from an electoral law—somewhat similar to the French—which gives the bloc winning a plurality two-thirds of the seats in a city council. In terms of the popular vote, the Leftists gained,

winning 39.7 per cent, according to incomplete returns, as compared with 32 per cent in 1948. The Christian Democratic bloc fell from 50.2 per cent in 1948 to 36.3 per cent. Meanwhile, the neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement made small but significant inroads among the voters.

### **Communists Decline**

In France the Communists are similarly expected to lose seats in the Assembly—perhaps dropping to 120 deputies as compared with the present 173, according to preliminary estimates by the French Ministry of the Interior. This would be partly because of the new electoral law, partly because of declining popular support. One symptom of public opinion has been the emergence of a "Titoist" split in the party with the establishment of a "French Communist Movement" opposed to Russian influence, led by Edouard Pesin, Charles Lemoine and Darius Le Corre. None of these men, however, was in the first rank of Communist leadership. Lacking funds

for organizing, they will probably be unable to form more than a small splinter movement.

Communist influence among the masses has also reportedly declined. Party membership has fallen. The circulation of Communist papers has diminished—*L'Humanité*, for example, from 380,000 in 1947 to 230,000 in 1950. In other elections Communists have fared poorly, winning 15 seats on the Council of the Republic in 1948 as compared with 73 in 1946, and 37 places in Departmental General Councils in 1949 as compared with 184 in 1945.

For Western observers the emergence of "neutralist" sentiment in France is only somewhat less disturbing than the scale of Communist activity. This has been an expression of the natural desire of Frenchmen, exhausted by the harrowing experiences of two world wars, to step aside from the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union in the hope of escaping involvement in any future conflict. French



government spokesmen point out, however, that neutralism remains primarily the attitude of a small group of intellectuals without real influence among the major parties. In the coming election no national party, no important faction and no outstanding candidate is proclaiming neutralism as a political platform. Among French non-Communists today the chief theme in political discussions is not whether France can avoid involvement in the cold war, but rather what role France should play in the Atlantic defense system.

The center parties—although sharply divided on such questions as the relationship of Church and state, socialism versus free enterprise, and social services against more expenditures for rearmament—agree on supporting the present pattern of the North Atlantic alliance. General Charles de Gaulle, however, while accepting the need for a Western defense system, demands a more prominent role for France.

The prospects for greater influence by the center parties in the next Assembly have been improved by electoral alliances formed in 75 of France's 98 constituencies. Among 87 joint lists announced, 53 include the three chief coalition parties—Socialists, Popular Republicans and Radical Socialists—and, in many cases, other moderate groups. Another 22 voting blocs have been formed among two of the Third Force parties. The Gaullists, while remaining aloof from the center parties, have announced 12 alliances with right-wing groups.

### De Gaulle's Attitude

By refusing to cooperate with the center parties de Gaulle has expressed symbolically the exclusive character of his aspirations. Had he consented to a common front against the Communists, he would have assured a very substantial reduction in Communist representation and a greater number of seats for his own party. But he would also have improved the prospects of the Third Force regime. At present, according to Ministry of the Interior estimates, de Gaulle may be able to win 125 to 130 seats. This may leave for the central parties some 370 seats out of the total of 627 in the National Assembly.

De Gaulle's decision reflects an attitude

which is viewed by his numerous critics as tantamount to quasi-fascism—a desire to hold exclusive power and a willingness to precipitate a sharp split in French politics between the Left and the Right which might lead to violence and dictatorial methods. De Gaulle's defenders, however, reject this charge, pointing out that the General has never resorted to illegal methods, does not denounce racial minorities and in the past was willing to resign from office rather than seize power by a *coup d'état*, as he might have done.

There is less difference of opinion about de Gaulle's views on France's role in the Atlantic defense system. Speaking in the Bois de Boulogne on May 1 before a crowd of 40,000 supporters, he opened his electoral campaign by attacking the present North Atlantic set-up as a form of "subordination" for France and criticized the government in Paris for its "weakness" in permitting "encroachments," notably the grant of rights to the United States to use air bases in French territory. Demanding that a French leader should have full command of the land, air and naval forces defending the Rhine, the Alps and French North Africa, he ridiculed the idea of a European army and urged that France, "building armies that are armies and disposing alone of her bases and communications, should herself fit them into the Atlantic strategy but in accordance with the conditions befitting her interest and her sovereignty."

Weighing reports that Paris, confronted by acute economic difficulties and rising demands from the workers for higher wages, has failed to maintain the rearmament pace called for in the plans announced early this year, some Western observers have hoped that a Gaullist victory would strengthen the Atlantic system. Others, however, have questioned not only the long-run effects of ascendant Gaullism on French stability, but anticipate that the intransigent General would make an unruly partner in the Western alliance. At this juncture, pre-election calculations are that the Third Force, attacked by both the Right and the Left, will continue to rule France through a series of kaleidoscopic coalition cabinets.

FRED W. RIGGS

(The second of two articles on the French elections.)

## News in the Making

**U.S. AID AND STRATEGIC MATERIALS:** President Truman and Congress are at odds over the means of blocking the flow of strategic materials to the Soviet bloc. The Chief Executive on June 2 protested as he signed a deficiency appropriations bill with a rider barring American aid to any country sending strategic goods to Communist countries. He asked for repeal of the rider on the ground that it effected "broad and sweeping" changes in our programs and told Congress to enact a separate measure if it felt a legislative ban necessary.

**COMMONWEALTH DEFENSE CHIEFS TO MEET:** Defense ministers of Britain, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa will meet in London late in June to consider mutual security problems, particularly in the Middle East. Canada will send an observer, but the three Asian dominions—India, Pakistan and Ceylon—will be absent because they feel that they cannot now assume commitments beyond their own frontiers.

**POLITICAL CRISIS IN GREECE?:** The far-from-stable political situation in Greece was jolted on May 30, when Field Marshal Alexander Papagos, who led Greek troops against the Germans in 1940 and against the Communist-led guerrillas in 1949, resigned as commander-in-chief in protest against attempts by King Paul to influence army appointments. Fear is expressed that pro-Papagos elements in the army may stir up trouble at a moment when the inclusion of Greece in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is being weighed by the Western nations. Meanwhile King Paul has temporarily assumed the post of commander-in-chief.

**OIL TALKS IN IRAN?:** The grave tension created by Iran's nationalization of the oil fields controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Company was somewhat eased on June 3, when the company offered to send representatives to Teheran for "full and frank discussions" with the Iranian government. While a Teheran spokesman declared that this offer was "an acceptance of Iran's taking over" the oil fields under the nationalization law, the company affirmed that it was "reserving its legal rights."